2. In Part IV, Demea argues against what he calls the "anthropomorphism" of Cleanthes and Philo. God is, Demea says, characterized by
perfect immutability and simplicity....He is entire in every point of place, and complete in every isntant of duration. No succession, no change, no acquisition, no siminution....And what he is in this moment he has ever been and ever shall be, without any new judgement, sentiment, or operation. He stands fixd in one simple, perfect state; nno can you ever say, with any propriety, that this act of his is different from that other, or that this judgment or idea has been lately formed and will give place, by succession, to any different judgment or idea.
Why doesn't the argument end here, with this statement of the perfect unknowable transcendent unity of God?
3. For what purposes does Philo announce, in Part VI, "The world, therefore, I infer, is an animal, and the Deity is the Soul of the world, actuating and actuated by it" (39-40)?
4. At other points in these dialogues, the world also gets compared to an animal, a vegetable, and a machine. What is the significance of these particular analogies? Why so many?
5. Related to 3: which of these analogies is, in your view, most effectively used in these dialogues?
Deadline: Wednesday (3/2), start of class.
6 comments:
In response to the first question, I think Cleanthes’ thought-experiment involving books aims to support his claim earlier in Part III that design possesses an intuitive quality for humans. When we look at books, Cleanthes argues, we realize that the work exhibits some kind of intellect and design. Regardless of how the work affects readers, it reflects some kind of intentions or plans by a creative force. Cleanthes suggests that Philo, even in his “skeptical play and wantonness,” (24) would not disagree with this claim. He then compares books to natural processes and creations, specifically animal anatomy, in order to show that designs exhibited are relatively simple compared to the designs observed in natural creations. Cleanthes claims that just by looking at natural things like a human eye, the idea of design will “flow in upon you with a force like that of sensation” (25). If we acknowledge that simple things like books exemplify design, then he thinks it would be incorrect to suppose that more complex things found in nature do not.
Another function of Cleanthes’ discussion of design found in books is to bolster his position against “blind skepticism.” He defines the responsibility of all skeptics to “adhere to common sense and the plain instincts of nature” (25). With this claim, Cleanthes suggests that the instinctual perceptions we have about the natural world constitute “common sense” and should not be denied. His argument in Part III appears to shift from strict reason to feelings and instincts.
I question, however, Cleanthes’ proposition that we must necessarily believe all the things that appear instinctual. Even if we do agree that identifying design in nature is a natural human tendency, does his argument prove that the approach is correct or something humans need? It seems as though he needs additional proof to strengthen the link between the intuitive nature of looking for design and the reasons why people need to believe in design or study it. In fact, through Philo and Demea, Hume presents us with reasons why humans should not embrace the notion design even if it is a natural inclination.
Answering question 2:
The argument doesn't end here because Cleanthes has been arguing against this transcendent being from the very beginning. To him, the Deity is at least somewhat relatable to mankind. While Demea might disagree, I can't see why he thought an argument at the opposite end of the spectrum, one in which the Deity is unknowable and fixed in time, would shut Cleanthes up.
In part IX, Cleanthes argues that, "There is no being, therefore, whose non-existence implies a contradiction. Consequently there is not being whose existence is demonstrable." In this quote, Cleanthes is arguing that if the Deity didn't exist as Demea says, the world would still be and there would be nothing to oppose the argument that he (Cleanthes) has put forth. It is only the existence of this Deity that could truly counter Cleanthes' argument, and the existence of that Deity is not possible empirically.
To summarize, Cleanthes argues that the Deity must be "demonstrable" (proveable), or else there is not argument to be made.
I agree with Steve, Demea is very rigid on the subject of God being something humans cannot fathom. And the argument does not end here, Cleanthes and Philo start talking about how it is impossible for a human being to stay as simple as God and says that people who think like this are atheists without knowing it. Cleanthes is arguing back that God is not perfect but more like a human, if there is a Deity then he probably created us in his likeness.
I particularly like the analogy about the world being a vegetable the most. Cleanthes Said that is has no organs of sense; no seat of thought or reason; no one precise origin of motion and action. Cleathes is saying that the Deity is not the soul of the Earth like Philo put it.
In response to number three, Philo is, I think, simply trying to play devil's advocate in order to disprove Cleanthes' point more than making a point he actually believes in. Cleanthes has claimed that like effects make like causes and is using this to try and convince Philo that there is only one God and that he is like humans because he created us. Philo uses an argument used by ancient Greeks, that God is like the soul and the universe is like the mind, to discredit Cleanthes. In doing so, he shows Cleanthes that God is unknowable and that all he's really doing is guessing: "If you assert that our limited experience is an unequal standard by which to judge of the unlimited extent of nature, you entirely abandon your own hypothesis and must thenceforward adopt our mysticism, as you call it, and admit of absolute incomprehensibility of the Divine Nature. (40). Philo is trying to corner Cleanthes and perhaps only confuse him and is successful -- he has a hard time coming up with an argument against Philo's and part VI ends with Philo unconvinced of Cleanthes' rebuttal.
I agree with Debbie that the text referenced in question three is the result of Philo setting up a hypothetical argument for the purpose of entrapping Cleanthes in a situation where he lacks a solid rebuttal and is revealed to be lacking in his logic. He says exactly as much when he says of the exercise, "You may thence learn the fallacy of your principles" at the end of section 6.
That the argument is insincere is shown when Philo says that the same argument will "find a numerous society of deities as explicable as one universal deity". This is not part of his original argument, but rather a refutation of it designed to show that the way Cleanthes is using logic is misapplied.
Regarding the first question, I agree with Dema that Cleanthes uses books to exemplify design in nature. Referring to works such as Illiad, Cleanthes asks, "could you possibly open one of them, and doubt, that its original cause bore the strongest analogy to mind and intelligence?" He then turns to human anatomy, and claims that, if one can see design in structures (such as a book) far simpler than those found in nature, it would be improbable to not also behold their design. Cleanthes continues, "Who can behold the male and female of each species, the correspondence of their parts and instinct...but must be sensible, that the propagation of the species is intended by Nature?" Cleanthes is arguing that the intricacy and complexities of things found in nature prove their inherent intent.
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